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Living through Nature 





To collaborate across cultures to efficiently tackle global environmental problems, we need to 
understand better the various ways in which individuals and groups value nature through their own 
situated worldviews. The Life Framework of Values aims at mapping the global diversity of values 
under the four dimensions of living from, with, in and as nature. Yet, it still faces difficulties to capture 
the interdependent and ever-changing aspects of the relation of human life to nature. This paper 
proposes a fifth dimension: living through nature. We are living through the world, continuously 
interacting with our milieu, shaping it and being shaped by it. Flows keep crossing the porous and 
dynamic borders of our bodies and communities. Finally, the example of Dōgen’s philosophy of 
mutual interdependence and impermanence is presented to illustrate the dimension of living through 
the world. 
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The reality of environmental changes and the threat that these changes pose 
to human ways of life cannot be denied. 1  In particular, climate change, 
desertification and biodiversity loss are “scientific facts” that enjoy wide 
consensus among the world scientific community. As environmental issues are 
global, questions such as “what meanings we give to life”, “what we want to 
sustain” and “what matters to us in nature” must be asked at the global level if we 
want to build solutions together. These questions of meaning in life lie at the 
crossroad of disciplines as diverse as philosophy of meaning in life, 
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environmental ethics, ecology and natural sciences. Crucially, they are also tied 
to norms and values and face a high diversity of worldviews. In this diverse global 
context, the distinction between scientific facts and situated value judgments is 
the key to prevent the imposition of one dominant worldview on others.  
Umbrella terms such as “the world” and “nature” attempt to cover the bundle 
of facts, phenomena and states of affairs that are and that surround us. Yet, there 
is an irreducible gap between this neutral objective reality and what we can 
perceive and access from our limited standpoint. To the best of our capacity and 
knowledge, we translate what we perceive into scientific facts using conventions 
that can be scientific, logic, linguistic, or else. These facts are the theories that can 
approximate the best what we can access of the reality according to the current 
scientific consensus. Filtered by authors and editors’ decision-making, they can 
be recorded in reports and journals. This filter makes the difference between what 
we can say and express, and what we actually say and. Far from being neutral, 
actions and speech –scientific or not– are strongly influenced by norms, values 
and meanings, and they are determined by the decision-making processes of 
individual phenomenological agents.  
Two remarks must be made. First, values require valuers. Meanings require 
thinkers. They are not facts existing outside of our thoughts, but beliefs that 
depend on our experience. Second, perceivers, thinkers and believers are always 
individuals. Yet meanings and beliefs are built through interactions with other 
people. We understand things in the world and value them within the frame of a 
particular worldview that we learn and appropriate in the process of growing up 
and living together with others in a specific sociocultural context. Worldviews are 
not neutral scientific facts; they are the frame and lenses through which one 
perceives and acts. They are sets of meanings, values, beliefs and habits that are 
partially invisible to their beholders, but crucially influence their decision-making 
and ways of life. Particular worldviews are held by individuals, often shared 
within groups and dominate in particular milieus, shaping how people live, think 
and act. Ultimately, we are always irreducibly trapped in our specific standpoint 
and we frame our perception and reality in a particular sociocultural worldview. 
Of course, we can minimize the weight of the subjective and cultural lenses by 
using tools and seeking towards objectivity; that is the core of the scientific 
enterprise. But when we understand, express and do something, we can never 
totally erase our standpoint, as it is inseparable from the fact of consciousness and 
thinking. Specifically, we cannot perceive, understand and act in the world 
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without being human. 
This paper explores some attempts to grasp the diversity of ways life and 
nature are valued, inscribed in different worldviews. First, the Life Framework of 
Values is presented. This framework recently gains traction among researchers 
and policy-makers aiming at capturing the various ways in which nature matters 
to human beings. Second, I suggest that the four axes of the framework (living 
from, with, in, as nature) do not encapsulate the dynamicity and temporality of the 
relation itself, and propose to add a fifth dimension, namely, living through nature. 
Finally, I illustrate the dimension of living through nature by shortly describing 
Dōgen’s philosophy of impermanence and interdependence of things. 
 
2. Life Framework of Values 
 
International environmental law-makers, environmental non-governmental 
organizations and the scientific community have attempted to capture the 
diversity of ways in which nature matters to different human societies (e.g. IPBES 
2016, IPBES 2019, Jamieson 2008, James 2019). The need for international 
collaboration at the global level to efficiently address global environmental issues 
confronts us with the challenge exposed previously, namely, that how individuals 
and groups value the world largely depends on their worldviews, these lenses that 
are most of the time invisible to their beholders. The idea of ecosystem services 
was arguably the most successful attempts to classify and to shed light on the 
various ways in which human beings benefits from the environment (Jax et al., 
2013). Yet, the idea of ecosystem services has suffered from its popularity among 
economists and is criticized for pushing forward a monetary valuation of the 
environment at the expense of other forms of valuation, thus supporting the 
commodification of nature. As a result of these criticisms, the idea of “nature’s 
contributions to people” was introduced, particularly popular among social 
sciences and humanities, because it was seen as encompassing non-monetary 
ways of valuing nature, including indigenous perspectives on the relation between 
human beings and their environment. Notably, the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) used the 
concept of nature’s contributions to people in its Global Assessment of 
Biodiversity.  
Recently, building on this conceptual tendency to include more diverse 
perspectives in the assessment of nature’s values, some researchers suggested the 
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Life Framework of Values to capture the global multiple ways in which people 
value nature. This framework aims at facilitating the expression of values that 
tend to be concealed in the usage of the concept of ecosystem services, because 
“if these ethical values are not elicited, they may not be considered in subsequent 
decision-making” (O’Connor and Kenter, 2019; Kenter et al. 2019; Meinard et al. 
2016). 
The Life Framework of Values provides a taxonomy to articulate different 
ways of valuing nature and the world. O’Neill et al. (2008) distinguished three 
ways in which the world matters to human beings. We first live from the world, as 
we fundamentally depend on the environment, for the fulfilment of our bodily 
needs (food, water, air, shelter, etc.), and for learning, inspiration and other various 
experiences. This first dimension is captured in the concept of ecosystem services 
that shows the different ways in which the environment matters to humans as a 
resource and provides us with a series of essential services. Second, we also live 
with nature and other species perceived as important others with whom we share 
the world. This view values nonhuman elements of the world as others who matter 
precisely because they are different from us. Human-nature dualism underpins 
this way of valuing the environment because we live with it. Third, we live in the 
world as a place that is the stage and matrix for our lives. Living in the world 
encompasses aspects of attachment to the land dear to many indigenous and local 
communities (e.g. Himes and Muraca 2018).  
Kenter and O’Connor added the fourth dimension of living as the world. 
Living as the world “points out to the more-than-human as self, individually and 
collectively” (2019, emphasis in the original). They illustrate this fourth 
dimension with aspects as various as “indigenous notions of oneness and kinship” 
(Gould et al. 2019), embodied and relation perspectives on life (Raymond et al. 
2017), Deep Ecology (Naess 1988) and “non-dual spiritual experience” (Wilber 
2001). Putting together so diverse aspects rooted in radically different traditions 
and worldviews not only makes the category of living as unclear and ambiguous, 
but it also presents important difficulties. To illustrate these difficulties, let us 
briefly sketch the debates between Deep Ecology, ecofeminism and accounts of 
“non-dual” “Asian” traditions. 
Deep Ecology claims that living beings have inherent worth regardless of 
their instrumental value compared to human needs (Drengson and Inoue 1995). 
Various formulations of this claim became the central demand of ecocentrism, 
which built itself in opposition to anthropocentrism. In particular, the “intrinsic 
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value of nature” has been argued to be anthropogenic (Callicott 1986, 142-143), 
or “discovered, not generated, by the valuer” (Rolston III 1988, 116). Yet, 
crucially, as values and meanings require thinking agents, this claim is deemed to 
be nothing but a normative assumption depending exclusively on the beliefs of 
the individual human beings defending this claim. In other words, natural 
elements can have “intrinsic” values only insofar as some individual human 
beings believe so. Thus, it cannot be argued for exclusively on objective or factual 
grounds, but must be defended transparently as a normative claim held by human 
individuals and groups. As a self-designed ecocentric theory, Deep Ecology 
rejects any claim of superiority of the human species over other species in the 
natural world (Seed et al. 1988, 36). The realization of our intimate dependency 
to the environment would lead the individual to adopt a strong ecocentric 
perspective, and to “expand the self” in an identification process with “others”, 
including other human beings, other animals, other living beings, ecosystems, and 
finally, the whole biosphere (Bragg 1996; Naess 1973, 1988). 
Ecofeminist thinkers also oppose the conception of the human self rooted in 
contemporary modern capitalist society and originated in patriarchal religious 
traditions placing human –especially man– as a ruler and a master above the rest 
of the living beings (Warren 1990; Plumwood 1993). Yet, many worry that the 
dissolution of the self in the environment, as implied by Deep Ecology thinking, 
may lead to a disappearance of agency and a dilution of responsibility. In 
particular, Val Plumwood argues that while Deep Ecology recognizes rightfully 
the wrongness of the dualism separating human from nature, its answer is a 
process of unification; “a metaphysics that insists that everything is really part of 
and indistinguisable from everything else” (1991, 13). By doing so, Deep Ecology 
is falling into a kind of atomism ignoring differences which are fundamental parts 
of everyday life (Grimshaw 1986), and a requirement to identify and address the 
different needs of other living beings.  
Proponents of ecocentrism and biocentrism sometimes suggest that Asian 
traditions that include meditative practices support the account of non-dual 
spiritual experiences of dissolution of the self in the world (e.g. Curtin 1994, 
James 2016, Loy 1999). Yet, utmost care must be taken when addressing the 
incredible diversity of “Asian traditions” and “mindfulness practices”. Indeed, 
there is a large scholarship within Asian traditions of thoughts that discusses the 
relation between humans and their world (e.g. Imanishi 2011, Yuasa 1987, Cheng 
2014). For example, in Buddhist studies only, there are multiple records of 
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traditions presenting “non-dual spiritual experience”, which nevertheless are 
rooted in radically different worldviews, in particular regarding the relation 
between human beings (or monks in particular) and the world (or natural elements 
in particular) (e.g. Dunne 2011). Needless to say, putting in the same box these 
highly diverse spiritual experiences triggered by meditation practices and other 
“indigenous notions of oneness and kinship” is not self-evident and requires 
justifications. Seen through the lenses of the dominant worldview of materialist 
and instrumental dualism, it is unsurprising that these various traditions appear to 
present similarities (McCarthy 2010). However, approached from within one of 
the aforementioned traditions, they might present irreconcilable differences. 
Moreover, while arguing for non-duality, many of these traditions still attribute a 
particularly privileged status to human beings compared to other living things. 
This is unsurprising, as modes of relation to nature depend on human-made social 
conventions, as suggested by the anthropologist Descola (2011). 
   
3. Living through Nature 
 
Setting aside those ambiguities regarding living as, living from, with, in, as 
nature does not encapsulate the dynamicity and temporality of the relation itself. 
In contrast, each of these four axes of the Life Framework of Values seems to 
presuppose the existence of two separable elements (humans and nature), and 
describes different ways in which they can relate. Living from captures an 
instrumental relation in which we, as agents, take what we want from the 
objectified nature. Living in partially includes relational values the importance 
that some elements of our surroundings, including the land itself, can have for us 
on a symbolic and identity- level. Living with reflects a dualist –but not 
necessarily hierarchical– relation in which human beings are cohabiting with 
sublime, dangerous and wild otherness, to which are attributed intrinsic values.  
Finally, living as tends to overlap the “human” element on the “natural” element 
and seeks correspondences, or even oneness, possibly at the expense of the 
concrete differences. Notably, living as might tend to erase the fundamentally 
human standpoint of our experiences and understanding. This obliteration risks 
concealing differences in needs, and thus faces the risk of judging other species’ 
needs and existence relatively to human needs, values and limited perceptions, as 
it is pointed out by the ecofeminist critique of Deep Ecology. 
Previously, we established that we never access the environment as it is, and 
 84 
that there are no values, norms and meaning to be found in the environment itself. 
Both our relation to the environment and our decision-making processes regarding 
what we do and what matters to us are mediated by webs of meanings and norms 
that cover our surroundings. These can be referred to as the “milieu”, a term 
coined by Augustin Berque (1996) and inspired by Watsuji Tetsurō’s (1889-1960) 
concept of fūdo 風土 (2004). The milieu, that is the environment as lived and 
perceived by subjective human beings, articulates immaterial worldviews, 
material usages of the space and attachment to the land (Droz 2018). Indeed, 
worldviews, ideas and values are not floating in an immaterial vacuum from 
which individuals freely pick up what they prefer and build their own lenses and 
opinions. Instead, we grow up in a particular sociocultural context, within a 
political and social structure, and we learn to express ourselves and think in a 
specific language. This is how the milieu as a matrix shapes who we are and what 
we can do. We make sense of the world through our interactions with others, and 
our behaviours are guided by the practices that are common and accepted in the 
place where we live. Even what we can imagine is largely limited by our cultural 
imaginary. 
The relation between human beings and their surrounding environment is 
dynamic and historical. On the one hand, there are no fixed borders between 
individuals and their surroundings. Instead, we are in a state of constant change, 
at the nexus of various flows. On the other hand, these changes unfold through 
time. As individuals, we live and die. We are growing old, getting sick, changing 
of social positions and worldviews. It is difficult to put limits and to draw borders 
between the elements of the webs of relations that constitute the milieu. Living 
through the world and nature might capture better the dynamicity and temporality 
of the relation.  
There are two facets to living through: the porosity of borders and the 
temporal impermanence of things. First, borders are blurred, porous and flexible. 
As individuals, we are clearly living through the world. Identity, self-image and 
social status are dialectically built and changing through interactions with others 
(Hermans 2011). The fact that ideas, meaning and values are built and changed 
through participatory sense-making implies that they do not belong to or are made 
up by particular individuals alone (De Jaegher et al. 2016). Instead, they appear 
as the only partially intentional result of countless more or less deliberate 
interactions with others and the world. The borders of the body are also porous 
(Yuasa 1987). Our body is continuously breathing and exchanging elements with 
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its immediate surroundings. Recent studies in biology and medicine show the 
surprising reach of the effects of changes in the bacteria of our microbiomes on 
our health, including on our mood and levels of anxiety (O’Doherty et al. 2016, 
Rees et al. 2018). They show that our microbiomes are interacting with the biomes 
surrounding us. Our microbiome, which is closely linked to many bodily 
functionalities and moods, is constantly influenced not only by what we eat and 
absorb, but by what we breathe and touch, as well as by the microbiomes of the 
people surrounding us. Our agency too is constrained by the design of our 
surroundings. The idea of affordances coined by Gibson (1979) shows how our 
perceptions of our environment are determined by what we could and want to do. 
Unsurprisingly, there are a high variety of theories of the self that attempt to 
account for experiences of oneness (as mentioned in living as), for questions of 
body ownership expanded to prosthesis, for the inclusion of intimate family 
members in one’s own conception of the self, and for no-self arguments 
widespread in Buddhist and Taoist traditions. 
Milieus themselves do not have clear and fixed borders. As they depend on 
the experience and practices of their subjective inhabitants, they are changing to 
the discretion of their habits. In particular, today’s high individual mobility for 
work or private purposes modifies the shapes and sizes of milieus and increases 
their porosity and mutual influences. Similarly, the drawing of borders of groups, 
be it nations, ethnicity or culture, is highly complex, multi-layered and political. 
In place of borders and clearly delimited things, thinking in terms of flows 
might be more accurate and efficient. Flows are constantly moving through things 
in the world. We already mentioned flows of nourishment, nutrients, bacteria (air, 
food, etc.) at the micro scale of bodies. Ideas and values, mediated through 
communication technologies and global networks, are also flowing through 
geographical, linguistic and cultural borders. Studies of globalization made clear 
that flows of goods and information are today covering the whole globe. 
Admittedly, the porosity of borders and the ubiquity of flows does not erase 
borders. Our body is still delimited by our skin, and we still perceive the world 
from our specific standpoint. Similarly, nation states still have geographical 
borders, and flows of information on the Internet are largely guided by 
sociocultural affinities, linguistic limitations and political censorship. 
Nevertheless, the porosity of borders is challenging the belief that there are clearly 
delimited things that can be fully separated from each other. The relation between 
things in the world (whatever scale or criteria we use to define “things”) does not 
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appear to be optional or secondary to the existence of these things. Instead, things 
–including human beings and natural elements– are interdependent, mutually 
determined and inseparable. 
Yet, if ideas and values can flow between milieus and if various worldviews 
can coexist in the same shared milieu, they are still anchored in particular milieus, 
embodied in the practices and behaviours of their beholders. Because, again, they 
do not exist independently of individual phenomenological agents, and the latter 
are always embodied and situated at a particular historical and geographical point. 
Which means that we can partially situate particular worldviews, the practices 
they support and their concrete impacts on the world in specific milieus. This 
gives us leverage points to identify what bundle of values and meanings are at the 
root of some practices and projects that lead to harmful environmental 
consequences. Besides, thanks to its concrete local anchorage, the milieu allows 
us to approach the diversity of practices and worldviews without resting on 
assumption of national or ethnic homogeneity. Indeed, any local milieu is 
irreducibly particular if only by virtue of the specific historical and geographical 
features of the place. So the experiences and ways of life of its inhabitants will 
inevitably be particular, regardless of the political attempts to conceal its 
particularity under a cover of sociocultural unity. 
The second facet of living through the world or nature is temporal 
impermanence. Birth, growth, aging, reproduction and death are central 
characteristics of human life, and even of life in general. While the definition of 
life in sciences is still widely debated, it is largely consensual that living things 
“take in energy from the environment and transform it for growth and 
reproduction” and that they “respond, and their stimulation fosters a reaction-like 
motion, recoil, and in advanced forms, learning.”2 Abstractly said, transmission 
and adaptation of information appear to be a key aspect of life. Human birth, death 
and reproduction are associated with various rituals, meanings and symbols in 
different sociocultural milieus. They give rhythm to the life of the individual, and 
the “life” of the community. But temporal impermanence is not limited to our 
bodies and physical things. Individuals learn and change of beliefs and habits. 
Ideas, beliefs, values and worldviews are also changing, gaining popularity or 
sinking into oblivion. Still, in comparison with the individual life span, 
worldviews and ideas appear to have some inertia.  
                                                     
2 https://www.nasa.gov/vision/universe/starsgalaxies/life%27s_working_definition.html. Consulted on 
October 2nd 2019. 
 87 
The bundle of meanings, practices, values and beliefs anchored in particular 
local environments that constitute milieus is continued, changed and transmitted 
throughout generations. As we have seen, the individual is shaped and guided by 
the milieu as a matrix and shapes the milieu through the imprints left by her 
actions (Berque, 1996). The individual lives, influences and is influenced by 
different milieus, and dies. Yet, through her way of life, the individual embodies 
and transmits meanings and values. The traces that the individual left in the 
milieu(s) continue to exist beyond her death (Droz, 2019). These traces can be 
material in the form of buildings or books, or they might be projects and ideas that 
survive the individual. The individual legacy, her posthumous reputation, her 
ideals and projects, but also her family and children continue to exist in her milieu 
after her death, at least for a while. In short, the milieu carries the signifying traces 
of the past, co-creates significance with the living human beings and transmits it 
to the future.  
This historical process of transmission of values and meaning is not 
ineluctable and neutral. It is mediated by our individual decision-making and by 
common policies, educational programs and large-scale projects. Notably, 
because we have some choice to do otherwise, we are also ethically responsible 
for the consequences of our way of life. By acting and thinking in a particular way, 
we support its existence and transmission, including beyond our death. These 
considerations reflect the highly political and ethical nature of questions of 
cultural survival and endangered languages and knowledge. Crucially, the 
continuation of particular worldviews is not uniquely immaterial, but also has 
concrete physical impacts. Indeed, the continuation of particular ways of life in a 
milieu is maintaining specific landscapes, and supporting particular ecosystems 
that depend on human activities (Flint et al. 2013). 
To summarize, the impermanence and the close intertwining of the 
sociocultural and environmental aspects of human life indicate how we are living 
through the world. We are constantly mutually influencing each other’s 
worldviews and values, and changing as a result. Moreover, these worldviews and 
values encourage ways of life that supports different types of ecosystems and 
species. Living through milieus captures the impermanent dynamicity of the 
relation between humans and their environment, and the porosity of their borders. 
It sketches worldviews based on processes and flows that are continuously in 
movements, in the line of recent developments in “process philosophy” (Winters 
2017; Seibt 2018).  
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4. Example: Dōgen’s Impermanence 
 
Living through was characterized by the temporal impermanence of things 
and their interdependence, as their porous borders are constantly permeated by 
various flows. Living through insists on the difficulty to draw fixed lines between 
two separate objects (such as humans and nature). It does not reject the other types 
of relations captured by the other prepositions, but adds another dimension. The 
relation between humans and nature can be seen as an instrumental relation 
between subjects and objects (from), as side-by-side coexistence (with), as nature 
providing a passive contextual receptacle (in), and as filled with correspondences 
and overlaps (as). In addition, the relation between humans and nature can be 
understood as interdependent, constantly changing and mutual interpenetrating 
(through). Echoes of each of these types of valuation can be found within most 
the worldviews and sociocultural contexts, with varying emphasis given to each. 
The emphasis on instrumental aspects of living from nature is well-known and 
largely dominating political and economic discourses nowadays. In contrast, let 
us briefly explore a radically different worldview that gave centrality to the aspect 
of living through nature. 
 The impermanence of things is one of the foundational claims of 
Buddhism. About 800 years ago, the Japanese Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200-1253) 
left his original affiliation with the Tendai School and founded a rival school of 
Zen Buddhism (Sōtō) after returning from his trip in China (Yokoi 1976). He left 
an extensive collection of texts that are still studied nowadays and remains a 
central figure of Zen Buddhism (Nishiyama and Stevens 1977, Takahashi 1983). 
The interpretation of Dōgen’s work is recognized to be hard, and attempting to 
draw different types of valuation of nature from his texts might appear to be 
anachronistic. An important first obstacle in treating the valuation of “nature” in 
Dōgen’s work is the very fact that the concept of was nonexistent in his historical 
and geographical context. The concept of "nature" as construed contemporary 
sciences was introduced in Japan in 1796 as a translation from Dutch into “jizen” 
(自然 , pronounced today as shizen) (Iwanami Buddhism Dictionary 1989; 
Iwanami Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1998; Jannel 2015). Before this translation, 
the word shizen had a different meaning rooted in Ancient Chinese. In particular, 
ziran (its Chinese pronunciation) was used by Laozi in relation with a way of 
being characterized by non-doing (wuwei) that humans can or should practice, and 
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with the co-determined emergence of things (Yinyuan), a fundamental premise in 
both Buddhist and Taoist cosmologies. Ziran as a translation for the Western 
"Nature" is likely to have been taken back into Chinese from the Japanese 
translation. Both meanings (Way of being existing by itself, and Western-style 
nature) coexist nowadays in the Chinese word Ziran and the modern Japanese 
word shizen (written with the same Chinese characters). There are other words 
that might get close to the idea of nature within these traditions, such as the 
equivalents for “world”, of “under heaven”, but they tend to include human beings 
in opposition to other godly realms and carry strong connotations intertwined in 
Buddhist and Taoist cosmologies. Still today, this historical background raises 
important difficulties in the approach and the discourses of “values of nature” in 
East Asia. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties perfectly illustrate the role of worldviews as 
the lenses that limit and shape how we see and make sense of the world. Dōgen 
himself warned us that we “should not be limited to human views” and “naïvely 
think that what one views as water is “what dragons and fish see as water and use 
as water.”” (Dōgen 1990: 2:198). While there was no clear opposition between 
“humans” and nature, because there was nothing such as the contemporary 
concept of nature, Dōgen still recognized the particularity of our human lenses. In 
other words, he noted that we are living with other living beings who perceive the 
world differently than us. He further acknowledged, in another text, that the living 
beings are living from and in their own environment:  
 
Fish swim through water, and swim as they may there is no limit to the 
water. Birds fly through the sky, and fly as they may there is no limit to 
the sky. And yet, fish and birds have never once left the water or sky. It 
is just that when the required activity is great the use is great, and when 
the need is small the use is small. In this manner, although they never fail 
to exhaust the borders of each and every point, turning about [freely] here 
and there, if a bird were to leave the sky, or if a fish were to leave the 
water, they would die instantly. One should know that [for a fish] life is 
by means of water, and [for a bird] life is by means of the sky. It is [also] 
the case that life is by means of birds and fish. And by means of life birds 
and fish are able to be. Moreover, we should proceed a step further. That 
there is the verification-in-practice of [human] lives is also just like this 
(Genjokoan, translation by Davis, 2009, 258). 
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Dōgen highlighted here the instrumental dependence of fishes, birds and humans 
on our direct environment, as each lives “by means of”, that is, from it. In addition, 
he pointed out that living things never leave their particular milieu, because if they 
did, they would “die instantly”. In other words, we are always living in a specific 
world or milieu on which we existentially depend. He adds that even if the fish 
were to leave water and aim at the sky, it “could not find its way or attain its place 
in” it. That is because this way of life, “this place, is neither great nor small, 
neither self nor other, neither already in existence nor [first] manifesting now, it 
is just as it is”. We belong to a place, to our milieu, in a way that there is no clear 
border separating it from us, and in a way that we could not exist “truly” out of it.  
In his historical, geographical and religious context, Dōgen’s revolutionary 
philosophical stance was to claim that all things have Buddha nature. He writes 
that “the grasses, trees and lands”, like “the sun, moon, and stars are mind; because 
they are mind, they are living beings; because they are living beings, they “have 
the Buddha nature.””(Busshō, translation by Bielefeldt, 2010, 21). Here is not the 
place to dive in the depths of his mysticism. Still, this description hinges at valuing 
living things in the world because of they share the same nature as human beings 
do, and thus living as living things, each in our specific place in the world. This 
perspective finds echoes in recent multispecies research that places human beings 
as members of a community of diverse species (e.g. Ogden et al. 2013; Locke and 
Muenster 2015; Kirskey and Helmreich 2010).  
Echoes of living as the world are also found in Dōgen’s most famous quote 
that points at the spiritual experience of oneness towards which practitioners must 
aim: “To study the self is to forget the self. To forget the self is to be verified by 
the myriad things [of the world]. To be verified by the myriad things is to let drop 
off the body-mind of the self and the body-mind of others.” (Genjokoan, 
translation by Davis, 2009, 256). By carefully studying ourselves, we would 
notice the porous and artificial nature of the separation between us and the world. 
Izutsu explains: 
 
One cannot become water because one is observing it from outside, that 
is to say, because the ego is, as an outsider, looking at water as an “object”. 
Instead of doing so, Zen continues to argue, one must first learn to “forget 
one’s ego-subject” and let oneself be completely absorbed into the water. 
One would then be flowing as the flowing river. No more would there be 
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any consciousness or ego. Nor would there be any “consciousness of” 
the water. Strictly speaking, it is not even the case that one becomes the 
water and flows on as the water. […] Simply: The water flows on. No 
more, no less” (Izutsu 1982: 81). 
 
Interestingly, the tensions found in expressions such as “flowing as the river”, 
widely discussed in Buddhist studies, echo the debates between Deep Ecology 
and ecofeminism regarding the dangerous dissolution of the self that could lead 
to a disappearance of agency and responsibility.   
Crucially, the experience of living as is for most practitioners a temporary 
exercise and not a constant state of being, namely, that we are living through the 
world. The experience of weakening the borders between the self and the world 
teaches us that the borders separating things in the world are porous and sheds 
light on the fundamental interdependence of all things. Dynamic interdependence 
is one facet of living through the world. The second facet, impermanence, is 
recurrent in Dōgen’s discussion of time (Moriyama and Sakon, 2018), and clearly 
transpires from this last quote: “In a like manner, if one tries to discern the myriad 
things with confused assumptions about the body-mind, it can mistakenly seem 
as though one’s own mind and nature are permanent.” (Genjokoan, translation by 
Davis, 2009, 257). 
In sum, the aspects of living from, in, with, as and through the world can be 
found together in Dōgen’s work. As it appears from this short depiction of his 
worldview, he does not emphasize aspects of living from the world as do current 
dominant worldviews. Instead, he stresses the interdependence and 
impermanence of the “myriad things” and warns us against the common mistaken 
assumptions of fixed and permanent independent beings, starting with ourselves. 
The spotlight is shed on how we are living through the world, as impermanent and 




Global environmental issues present us with the need to understand how 
individuals and groups value nature and the world through their own situated 
worldviews. We need to understand what meanings different people give to life 
and nature in order to find some common grounds and tackle together global 
environmental problems. Yet, we always access ourselves and the world through 
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the lenses of our situated sociocultural worldview, tainted with normative values 
and judgements. Such questions regarding meaning of life and nature require an 
interdisciplinary dialogue, especially in a global and diverse context. Accordingly, 
this paper bridged inputs from ecology, anthropology, environmental ethics, 
Japanese philosophy and philosophy of meaning in life.  
One of the current interdisciplinary framework to map the different ways in 
which nature matters to humans is the Life Framework of Values. It is composed 
of four axes; living from, with, in and as nature or the world. Yet, these four axes 
fail to capture the dynamicity and temporality of the relation between humans and 
their surrounding reality. This paper highlighted a possible fifth dimension: living 
through nature. We are continuously in changing and interdependent interactions 
with our milieu, shaping it and being shaped by it. Flows keep crossing the porous 
and dynamic borders of our body and communities. This dimension of living 
through was briefly illustrated by the example of Dōgen’s philosophy of 
interdependence and impermanence. 
As individual, sociocultural groups and humanity, we are living through the 
world. We exist as a nexus of flows. We have the possibility to influence the 
orientation of these flows; that is ethical decision-making. We exist in the midst 
of these flows, but we cannot separate ourselves from them, or fully objectify them 
into something we are living with, or completely erase differences and equalize 
us as the world. Nowadays, communication media and the internet confront us 
with flows of diverse meanings and values that are often taken out of their 
contextual worldview, increasing the risks of misunderstandings and conflicts. It 
is thus crucial to remind us that besides some general considerations that human 
life requires some basic environmental and social conditions, questions regarding 
meaning and value remain normative. Meanings and values are not to be found in 
reality, but they are to be assigned from within a particular worldview, and 
embodied and lived by subjective human individuals. Importantly, any single 
permanent global answer to these normative questions would risk imposing the 
subjective perspective of a dominant group at the expenses of other worldviews.  
To foster intercultural collaboration and minimize conflicts and 
misunderstanding, we need to understand better the various ways in which we 
value and make sense of nature. In this quest, the Life Framework of Values 
provides a precious starting point. The recent addition of the fourth dimension of 
living as is a particularly encouraging step towards including worldviews that are 
usually marginalized in global political and scientific discourses. Yet, as shown in 
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this paper, some perspectives on the temporality and dynamicity of human life 
still seem difficult to account for with the four dimensions living from, with, in 





Berque, Augustin. 1996. être humains sur la terre, principes d’éthique de 
l’écoumène. Paris: le débat Gallimard.  
Bielefeldt, Carl. 2010. “Treasury of the Eye of the True Dharma, Book 3, 
Buddha Nature (Busshō).” (Introduction and Translation), Soto Zen Journal 25, 
17-23. 
Bragg, Ann Elizabeth. 1996. “Towards Ecological Self: Deep Ecology Meets 
Constructionist Self-Theory.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 16, 
Academic Press Limited, 93-108. 
Callicott, J. Baird. 1986. “On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species.” The 
Preservation of Species, Bryan G. Norton (ed.), Princeton University Press, 
138-172. 
Cheng, Kai-Yuan. 2014. “Self and the Dream of the Butterfly in the Zhuangzi.” 
Philosophy East and West 64:3, 563-597. 
Curtin, Dean. 1994. “Dōgen, deep ecology and the ecological self.” 
Environmental Ethics 16:2, 195-213. 
Davis, Bret W. 2009. “The Presencing of Truth: Dōgen’s Genjokoan.” Buddhist 
Philosophy: Essential Readings, Jay Garfield and William Edelglass (ed.), 
Oxford University Press, 251–259. 
Dōgen. 1990. Shobogenzo. Mizuno Yaoko (ed.). Tokyo: Iwanami. 
De Jaegher, Hanne, Anssi Peräkylä, and Melisa Stevanovic. 2016. “The Co-
Creation of Meaningful Action: Bridging Enaction and Interactional 
Sociology.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 371, 1-10. 
Descola, Philippe. 2011. L’écologie des autres – L’anthropologie et la question 
de la nature. Paris: Editions Quae, Sciences en questions. 
Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue. 1995. The Deep Ecology Movement: An 
Introductory Anthology. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books. 
Droz, Laÿna. 2018. “Watsuji’s Idea of Self and the Problem of Spatial Distance 
in Environmental Ethics.” European Journal of Japanese Philosophy 3, 145-
 94 
168. 
Droz, Laÿna. 2019. “Watsuji’s Milieu and Intergenerational Ethics.” 
Environmental Ethics, 41:1, 37-51.   
Dunne, John. 2011. “Toward an understanding of non-dual mindfulness.” 
Contemporary Buddhism 12:1, 71-88. 
Flint, C. G., I. Kunze, A. Muhar, Y. Yoshida, and M. Penker. 2013. “Exploring 
Empirical Typologies of Human–Nature Relationships and Linkages to the 
Ecosystem Services Concept.” Landscape and Urban Planning 120, 208–217.  
Gibson, James. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Gould R., Pai M., Chan K., and Muraca B. 2019. “How one indigenous 
worldview informs relational values and social values.” Sustainability Science 
14, 1213–1232. 
Grimshaw, Jean. 1986. Philosophy and Feminist Thinking. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Hermans, Hubert J. M. 2011. “The Dialogical Self: A Process of Positioning in 
Space and Time.” The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Shaun Gallagher (ed.). 
New York: Oxford University Press, 654-680.. 
Himes, A, Muraca B. 2018. “Science direct relational values: the key to 
pluralistic valuation of ecosystem services.” Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 35, 1-7. 
Imanishi, Kinji. 2011. Le monde des êtres vivants, une théorie écologique de 
l’évolution. Pamela Asquith (trad.), Paris: Wildproject. 
IPBES. 2016. Preliminary guide regarding diverse conceptualisation of multiple 
values of nature and its benefits, including biodiversity and ecosystem 
functions and services. Nairobi: UNEP. 
IPBES. 2019. Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on 
biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Nairobi: UNEP. 
Iwanami Buddhism Dictionary. 1989. Iwanami (Iwanami Bukkyō Jiten). 
Izutsu, Toshihiko. 1982. Towards a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. Boulder: 
Prajna Press. 
Jamieson, Dale. 2008. Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction. Cambridge 
University Press. 
James, Simon. 2016. Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics. London: 
Routledge. 
 95 
James, Simon. 2019. “Natural Meanings and Cultural Values.” Environmental 
Ethics 41 :1, 3-16. 
Jannel, Romaric. 2015. “Vie de concepts: le vocabulaire philosophique au 
Japon. ” A L'épreuve, 10-12.  
Jax, Kurt et al. 2013. “Ecosystem services and ethics.” Ecological Economics, 
93: C, 260-268. 
Kenter, Jasper O. et al. 2019. “Loving the mess: Navigating diversity and 
conflict in social values for sustainability.” Sustainability Science 14, 1439–
1461. 
Kirksey, S. Eben. and Stefan Helmreich. 2010. “The Emergence of Multispecies 
Ethnography.” Cultural Anthropology 25, 545-576. 
Locke, Piers and Ursula Münster. 2015. “Multispecies Ethnography.” Oxford 
Bibliographies. Oxford University Press. 
Loy, David. 1999. “Loving the World as Our Own Body: The Non-Dualist 
Ethics of Taoism, Buddhism, and Deep Ecology.” Asian and Jungian Views of 
Ethics, Carl Becker (ed.). Westport: Greenwood Press.  
McCarthy, Erin. 2010. Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through 
Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Meinard, Yves, Malgorzata Dereniowska and Jean-Sébastien Gharbi. 2016. “The 
ethical stakes in monetary valuation methods for conservation purposes.” 
Biological Conservation, 199:67-74. 
Moriyama, Shinya and Sakon Takeshi. 2018. “Dōgen on Time and the Self.” 
Tetsugaku 2, 135-150. 
Naess, Arne. 1973. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement.” Inquiry 16: 1. 
Naess, Arne. 1988. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nishiyama, Kosen and John Stevens. 1977. A Complete English Translation of 
Dōgen Zenji’s Shobogenzo (The Eye and Treasury of the True Law) Vol. II., 
Nakayama Shobo. 
O’Connor, Seb and Jasper O. Kenter. 2019. “Making intrinsic values work: 
integrating intrinsic values of the more-than-human world through the Life 
Framework of Values.” Sustainability Science 14, 1247-1265. 
Ogden, Laura A., Billy Hall and Kimiko Tanita. 2013. “Animals, Plants, People, 
and Things: A Review of Multispecies Ethnography.” Environment and Society 
4, 5-24.  
 96 
O’Neill, John, Alan Holland and Andrew Light. 2008. Environmental Values. 
London: Routledge. 
O’Doherty, Kieran C., Alice Virani and Elizabeth S. Wilcox. 2016. “The Human 
Microbiome and Public Health: Social and Ethical Considerations.” American 
Journal of Public Health, 106:3, 414-420. 
Plumwood, Val. 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London/New York: 
Routledge.  
Plumwood, Val. 1991. “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental 
Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism.” Hypatia 6:1. 
Raymond, Christopher M., Matteo Giusti and Stephan Barthel. 2017. “An 
embodied perspective on the co-production of cultural ecosystem services: 
toward embodied ecosystems.” Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 1, 1-22. 
Rees, Tobias, Thomas Bosch and Angela Douglas. 2018. “How the microbiome 
challenges our concept of self.” PLoS Biology 16:2. 
Rolston III, Holmes. 1988. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the 
Natural World. Temple University Press. 
Seed, John, Macy Joanna, Fleming Pat and Naess Arne. 1988. Thinking Like a 
Mountain: Toward a Council of All Beings. Philadelphia and Santa Cruz: New 
Society Publishers. 
Seibt, Johanna. 2018. “Process Philosophy.” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).Accessed on November 1st 2019.  
Takahashi, Masanobu. 1983. The essence of Dōgen. Yuzuru Nobuoka (trans.). 
Routledge. 
Yuasa, Yasuo, 1987. The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory. 
Nagatamo Shigenori and T. P. Kasulis (trans.). Albany: SUNY Press. 
Yokoi, Yuho, 1976, Master Dōgen: An Introduction with Selected Writings. 
Weatherhill.  
Warren, Karen. 1990. “The promise and power of ecofeminism.” Environmental 
Ethics 12:2, 125-146. 
Watsuji, Tetsurō. 2004. Fūdo: Ningengakuteki Kōsatsu. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
first published in 1935. 
Iwanami Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998. Iwanami (Iwanami Tetsugaku Shisō 
Jiten). 
Winters, Andrew M. 2017. Natural Processes: Understanding Metaphysics 
Without Substance. Palgrave. 
 97 
Wilber K. 2001. No boundary. Boston: Shambhala Publications.  
